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I. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional thinking is that tax transition rules matter because 
of the gains and losses that can arise when Congress changes the 
Internal Revenue Code (Code). Municipal bonds can illustrate what 
is normally thought to be at stake. Interest on municipal bonds is 
exempt from federal income tax.1 Bond investors rely, at least to 
some extent, on the continued vitality of this exemption and as such 
are willing to accept lower yields than they otherwise would on 
comparable taxable bonds.2 After all, bond investors care only about 
after-tax returns. Unless Congress decided to grandfather the tax 
treatment of existing bonds, if the exemption were repealed 
tomorrow, the value of these tax-exempt bonds would fall. 
Conceptually, but not formally, the federal government has made 
itself a party to the bond, since investors look to the government for 
part of their returns. By repealing the exemption, the government 
has, in a sense, defaulted on its obligation. As a consequence of the 
repeal, investors are thought to suffer a "transition loss"3 absent some 
rule grandfathering the tax treatment of old investments. 
The issue of tax transitions has produced a rich body of 
scholarship, and separate articles by Professors Michael Graetz4 and 
Louis Kaplow5 are considered to be the preeminent scholarly works in 
this field. In their articles, Graetz and Kaplow argue that 
grandfathering old investments is inefficient because it introduces 
moral hazard (and thus economic distortions)6 and it is costly from a 
revenue perspective.7 Their arguments are based on an analogy 
between the risk of repeal and the risk of market or casualty losses. 
For example, investments in a factory may be rendered obsolete by 
changing technology or destroyed altogether by fire. Individuals 
usually face these risks without government protection. As a result, 
1 See l.R.C. § 103. 
2 HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 176-77 (Frank J. Fabozzi & T. 
Dessa Fabozzi eds., 4th ed. 1995). 
3 Similar "transition gains" would arise if the exemption were expanded and 
applied to preexisting bonds. 
4 Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax 
Revisions, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977). 
5 Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions , 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509 (1986). Kaplow's article is broad in scope, analyzing tax and nontax transitions 
(such as government takings and product bans). 
6 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 71; Kaplow, supra note 5, at 536. 
7 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 72; Kaplow, supra note 5, at 555. 
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they should act efficiently to anticipate and adapt to new technologies 
and to protect their property from fires. If the government was to 
provide insurance, it would introduce moral hazard - an inefficient 
reduction in the incentive to anticipate, adapt, and protect. In Graetz 
and Kaplow's view, the same issues are present with political risks 
(e.g., the risk that a tax preference will be repealed). Grandfathering 
old investments when the tax law changes is analogous to providing an 
insurance policy against the risk of repeal. Under a grandfathering 
regime, taxpayers have no incentive to adapt to political changes.8 
Moreover, since grandfathering is paid for by the public at large, it 
creates economic distortions separate and distinct from those created 
by tax increases or governmental borrowing.9 
The argument that grandfathering produces inefficient incentives 
has greatly affected subsequent scholarship. Professor Daniel Shaviro 
refined this incentive-based argument and applied it to a wide variety 
of issues that would arise by transitioning the present tax regime 
toward a comprehensive income or consumption tax. 10 Other scholars 
have questioned Graetz and Kaplow's assumptions and have 
suggested countervailing factors. For the incentive-based argument to 
work, we need to make the questionable assumption11 that political 
changes generally bring about in an increase in societal welfare.12 
Giving taxpayers an incentive to anticipate and respond to bad laws 
would only compound the problem. Professor Kyle Logue has argued 
8 Graetz rhetorically asked, 
Why should efficiency demand a different result when losses occur because 
a change in tastes or societal conditions is reflected through the political 
process, rather than in the market? ... The risks of a change in law do not 
seem necessarily different in kind nor [sic] in magnitude from the risks of a 
change in market demand or technology. 
Graetz, supra note 4, at 65; see also Kaplow, supra note 5, at 533-36 ("[T]here is little 
to distinguish losses arising from government and market risk."). 
9 See Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 
274-75 (1993). 
10 DANIEL SHAVlRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000); see also Kyle D. 
Logue, If Taxpayers Can't Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A Public Choice 
Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1507 (2000) [hereinafter 
Logue Review] (reviewing SHAVlRO,supra). 
11 See J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the 
Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155, 
1162-65 (1989). 
12 See Michael J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1825 
(1985) (noting "the theology that changes induced by the political process are 
inherently inefficient"); Kaplow, supra note 5, at 521 (noting "assum[ption] that the 
reforms themselves are desirable at the time they are made"). 
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that eliminating the possibility of grandfathering may ·actually make 
tax preferences more expensive.13 A tax preference can be viewed as a 
subsidy enacted to encourage targeted investments or activities. 
Without the expectation of grandfathering protection, taxpayers may 
demand expensive premiums out of fear that they will be whipsawed 
by an opportunistic government.14 Finally, Professors Mark Ramseyer 
and Minoru Nakazato have argued that removing grandfathering 
protection may increase the level of political lobbying and associated 
costs, because more is at stake in the legislative process.15 These 
criticisms, however, do not address the theoretical underpinnings of 
the Graetz-Kaplow view, which has influenced the thinking of tax 
attorneys16 and Congressional staff.17 The view that grandfathering is 
expensive and inefficient enjoys acceptance inside and outside the 
academy.18 
The goal of this article is to challenge Graetz and Kaplow's 
theoretical underpinnings directly, setting forth the case that the 
choice of tax-transition rules is generally irrelevant from an efficiency 
or revenue perspective. Risk factors may even support a transition 
policy of grandfathering. Transition rules would seem to matter most 
where a taxpayer makes an investment today with some expectation 
of receiving benefits in the future under a tax preference. The tax 
preference is simply a series of forward subsidy payments, and the 
transition rule is a way of describing the nature of payments in the 
event the preference is repealed. Under a grandfathering regime, the 
subsidy payments continue. Without grandfathering, however, the 
subsidy payments cease. The government could even retroactively 
repeal the tax preference, causing negative cash flows (i.e., additional 
taxes) after repeal. Taxpayers operating under rational expectations 
will value tax preferences by forecasting the likelihood and nature of 
these governmental actions. After making this forecast, taxpayers will 
value tax preferences by discounting all of the cash flows to present 
value. 
13 See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the 
Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1138-43 (1996) 
[hereinafter Logue Article]; see also discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
14 See Logue Article, supra note 13; see also discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
15 See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 11, at 1171-73; see also infra Part IV.C. 
Ramseyer and Nakazato see the power to grandfather old investments as a valuable 
prerogative that members of Congress can use to extract campaign contributions and 
the like. Thus, they see little reason for Congress to give up this right. 
16 See Franklin L. Green, The Folly of Long-Term Planning: Comments on the 
Instability ofthe Tax Law, 74 TAXNOTES481, 481 (Jan. 27, 1997). 
17 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND 
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS TO REPLACE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (Joint Comm. Print 
1995). 
18 See, e.g. , Logue Article, supra note 13, at 1138. 
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The inquiry should be framed in terms of the substantive policy 
(i.e., what is Congress trying to achieve with the tax preference), the 
nominal tax preference (i.e., how does the Code describe the 
preference), and the transition policy (i.e., how Congress handles 
preexisting investments when it repeals tax preferences). Obviously, 
transition policy affects substantive policy. A change from a 
grandfathering to a no-grandfathering regime would reduce the 
present value of a tax preference, because investors today will expect 
lower subsidy payments in the future. As a result, this change would 
reduce future revenue costs and the level of tax-motivated 
investments. To maintain the status quo with respect to substantive 
tax policy, Congress would need to increase the nominal tax 
preference. If Congress were simply interested in affecting 
substantive tax policy, it could do so by lowering the nominal tax 
preference without altering its transition policy. This raises the 
question of whether transition policy can produce unique efficiency or 
revenue gains. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether a particular 
transition policy, when coupled with an appropriate change in the 
nominal tax preference, can achieve efficiency gains without 
disrupting the current substantive tax policy. A major goal of this 
article is to demonstrate that, in this respect, no transition policy is 
inherently superior. 
With respect to substantive tax policy, all that matters is that tax 
preferences are efficiently priced at the time the initial, tax-preferred 
investments are made. Economic or political change may occur that 
requires the repricing or repealing of a tax preference for future 
investments. What if Congress delays to act? The keen insight of 
Graetz and Kaplow is that a transition policy of no-grandfathering can 
result in an automatic repricing of the tax preference. If taxpayers 
know that repeal without gra!J.dfathering is inevitable in the short 
term, they will also know that the tax preference is nearly worthless. 
But incentive structures may work both ways, and a rule of no-
grandfathering reduces the incentive of Congress to act promptly in 
repealing obsolete tax preferences. It also gives taxpayers the 
incentive to duplicate governmental costs in forecasting the need for 
political change. Moreover, the fact that a tax preference will be 
repealed in the future speaks only to the appropriate future price 
associated with the substantive policy; it may not speak to the 
appropriate present price. 
Following this Introduction, Part II describes the issues of tax 
transitions and tax preferences and the methodology for examining 
them. The critical points are that tax preferences are a series of cash 
flows, the transition rule merely describes how political change will 
alter the cash flows, and taxpayers will forecast expected cash flows 
without bias. Part III examines the revenue and efficiency effects of 
different transition regimes and concludes that there generally are 
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none. Congress cannot achieve its substantive policy goals more 
cheaply or efficiently by altering transition policy. Part IV introduces 
risk factors into the analysis, and tentatively suggests that a policy of 
grandfathering may in fact be optimal. Part V has some concluding 
thoughts. 
II. ANALYZING TAX PREFERENCES AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
The purpose of this part is to frame the relevant issues in tax 
transitions and to explain the methodology of this article. Section A 
provides formal definitions for the three most prominent transition 
rules. Section B briefly describes tax preferences, particularly those 
where tax benefits are paid out in installments. Section B also 
describes the important assumption that efficiency or revenue gains 
from a choice of tax transition policy are noteworthy only if they can 
be achieved without disrupting the substantive policy of the tax 
preference. Section C notes the importance of ex ante analysis in the 
tax transitions debate. Section D explains the rational expectations 
model used in this article. 
A. Transition Rules Defined 
Transition rules describe the tax treatment of existing investments 
when the tax law changes. Under a grandfathering regime, the old 
rules would continue to apply to old investments. Under a 
prospectivity regime, the new rules would apply to accounting periods 
beginning on the date the law changes (e.g., all interest received after 
the date of change would be subject to the new rule). Under a 
retroactivity regime, the new rules would apply to accounting periods 
before and after the date the law changes (e.g., all interest received 
after the date of change and interest received in the prior year would 
be subject to the new rule ).19 On the rare occasions it is used in tax 
legislation, retroactive repeal is usually applied to shut down tax 
shelters or make technical corrections. 
These definitions are formal in nature, as almost any law change 
can affect the value of existing investments.20 Prospectivity can reduce 
the value of investments where taxpayers expected to receive future 
benefits. Repeal with grandfathering may even increase the value of 
existing tax-preferred investments by eliminating the supply of future 
tax-preferred investments.21 Moreover, the availability of delayed 
effective dates, phase-ins, and restrictions on the transfer of 
19 For a discussion on the constitutional limits on retroactivity, see Levmore, 
supra note 9, at 270 n.l2. 
20 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 52-53. 
21 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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grandfathered status make the number of available transition rules 
uncountable. 
As the usual debate is whether to grandfather old investments on 
repeal,22 the remainder of this article compares the transition policy of 
grandfathering versus the transition policy of no-grandfathering. As 
used below, the· term no-grandfathering means prospectivity unless 
noted otherwise. 
B. Tax Preferences 
Tax preferences are generally thought to be special tax treatments 
that apply to certain types of investment or consumption. They are 
equivalent to subsidies.23 The tax-exemption for municipal bonds24 is 
the example used throughout the literature25 and will be used in this 
article as well.26 Tax preferences abound throughout the Code, the 
largest being for owner-occupied real estate and employee health-care 
and pension benefits.27 Before knowing whether a tax provision is a 
preference, we need to know what the optimal tax treatment should 
22 Professor Kaplow contends that we should also be concerned about 
"transition gains" that arise when Congress enacts a new tax preference and applies it 
to existing investments. In a sense, Congress has applied a policy of prospectivity to 
the existing investments. Grandfathering the old investments would mean not 
extending preferential treatment to them. See Kaplow, supra note 5, at 552-56. 
Professor Kaplow objects to the fact that Congress often pursues an asymmetric 
transition policy by applying a rule of prospectivity when enacting preferences and a 
rule of grandfathering when repealing them. Thus, Congress allows "transition gains" 
but prevents "transition losses." This article concludes that transition rules are 
irrelevant or ambiguous from the perspective of economic efficiency. For the sake of 
simplicity, the analysis focuses on the results when Congress repeals a tax preference. 
The conclusion is equally applicable where Congress enacts a new tax preference. 
23 See Logue Article, supra note 13, at 1132. 
24 Compare I.R.C. § 103 (exempting municipal bond interest from federal 
income tax), with I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (generally including interest in gross income). 
25 See Levmore, supra note 9, at 266 n.3. As Levmore noted, the exemption is 
something of an anachronism, enacted under the view that it was constitutionally 
required. The Supreme Court, however, has held otherwise. See South Carolina v. 
Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
26 Those who would have the exemption repealed should reflect on its worth to 
commentators. I can think of no other tax preference that illustrates the issues of tax 
transitions and tax preferences so well. 
27 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2002, at tb1.22-4. By the government's reckoning, the 
exemption for municipal bond interest costs $23.5 billion per year. The preferences 
that apply to owner-occupied real estate are the deductibility of mortgage interest, the 
deductibility of state and local taxes, and the exclusion of gains upon sale, which total 
about $111 billion per year. The exclusions for employer-provided health care and 
pensions total about $212.6 billion per year. 
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be. Of course, this depends on the baseline tax regime (e.g., income 
or consumption tax) and second-best analysis when this baseline 
yields impractical results.28 
This article will also focus only on tax preferences involving 
installment payments.29 To illustrate, a taxpayer will buy a municipal 
bond with some expectation of receiving tax benefits in future periods. 
In contrast, the exclusion for employee health-care benefits is paid in 
a lump sum. 
The government essentially makes a purchase when it subsidizes 
certain activities and investments. Where the subsidy is a lump sum, 
the price (i.e., the value of the payment) is clear. Where the subsidy is 
paid in installments, however, the price is not so clear, but is 
nonetheless amenable to financial analysis because the installment 
payments are akin to a financial instrument. Under grandfathering, 
the installment payments are, in a sense, guaranteed. Under no-
grandfathering, they are contingent on the future life of the tax 
preference. 
More generally, we can view tax preferences as deviations from 
some abstract tax ideal (typically a comprehensive income or 
consumption tax), where the deviation is undertaken to achieve some 
policy goal. I will refer to this policy goal as the substantive policy 
throughout the article. The policy goal may be an incentive subsidy 
for some type of investment, production, or consumption. Or, it may 
be the administrative feasibility of the tax laws or anything else the 
government is trying to achieve. For the most part, I will assume that 
the substantive policy is an incentive subsidy (typically the exemption 
of municipal bonds undertaken to lower the cost of municipal 
borrowing). 
An important assumption of this article is that the efficiency or 
revenue benefits of any tax transition regime must be decoupled from 
the wisdom of the tax preference. In other words, the substantive 
policy must be held constant. Tax preferences, like any subsidy, 
create economic distortions and revenue costs. Implementing a rule 
of no-grandfathering would decrease these distortions and costs if the 
nominal tax preference was held constant. But this may be only 
because it reduces the value of the subsidy. For transition policy to be 
superior, however, we must show that it can produce efficiency gains 
beyond any gains achieved from altering the substantive policy. 
For example, implementing a policy of no-grandfathering would 
cause municipal bond prices to fall and nominal yields to increase, 
even without a change to the nominal exemption itself.30 This is 
28 See, e.g., Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-Time vs. Periodic: An 
Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L. REv. 305, 307 (1994). 
29 . For an argument agamst using such tax preferences, see id. passim. 
30 This assumes, for sake of simplicity, that the only expected political outcomes 
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because investors will require higher yields to offset the expected 
losses in event of future repeal. The increase in yields would make 
subsequent municipal borrowing more expensive. Presumably, the 
substantive policy of the exemption is to lower the cost of borrowing 
by municipalities. To keep the substantive policy intact, Congress 
would need to increase the nominal tax preference (perhaps with a 
credit of some type) that would bring the cost of borrowing back 
down to its prior level. A particular transition policy is superior to 
another if, but only if, it allows Congress to maintain the same cost of 
municipal borrowing while lowering economic distortions or revenue 
costs. More generally, the superior policy will produce efficiency and 
revenue gains while keeping the price31 of the subsidized good or 
investment constant. 32 
C. Rational Expectations and the Relevance of Reliance 
A major part of past scholarship is the notion of "reliance" on 
continued tax transition rules. It was thought at one time that the 
efficient tax transition rule would always grandfather pre-repeal 
investments in order to protect reliance on the old law.33 Refuting 
these reliance arguments was the project of Professors Graetz and 
Kaplow, although these arguments experienced a revival in later 
scholarship.34 Reliance, however, suggests some moral or contractual 
right to have tax benefits continued into the future. The great 
importance of Professor Graetz's article was in refuting any moral 
right to have tax benefits continue. No subsequent scholar has 
attempted to argue otherwise (nor will I). As for enforceable legal 
rights to continued tax benefits after repeal, they do not exist.35 
are maintenance of the status quo and full repeal. 
31 Of course, keeping the price the same would keep the quantity of subsidized 
goods and investments the same. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 9 (Aspen 5th ed. 1998). 
32 Congressional goals could conceivably have nothing to do with price levels, 
increased production, or even transfer payments. Instead, Congress may simply be 
trying to impress voters with legislation, even if the voters will receive no benefits. In 
other words, Congress is just trying to make people feel good that it is doing 
something about an issue. We can probably assume people will not feel any worse if 
the feel-good legislation were subject to future repeal without grandfathering. I am 
hesitant to give an example of feel-good legislation, as the question is one of 
subjective intent. Indeed, almost anything produced by the political process will have 
serious-minded defenders. 
33 See Levmore, supra note 9, at 267-68; Logue Article, supra note 13, at 1135-36. 
34 See SHAVIRO, supra note 10, at 3. 
35 Professor Logue argues that something similar to these rights should exist in 
certain circumstances. See Logue Article, supra note 13, passim. 
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Not only is "reliance" a loaded term, it also lacks descriptiveness. 
The fact that one should or should not rely on the continued tax 
exemption for municipal bonds is not helpful in describing whether 
they are good investments. What would help answer this question is a 
description of expectations about future changes and their effects on 
economic values. Taxpayers are not prescient, meaning that 
expectations need to be expressed in probabilistic terms. From an ex 
ante perspective, taxpayers who expect a very low probability of 
repeal may not particularly care whether grandfathering will be 
available if the tax preference is ever repealed. Where the probability 
of repeal is substantial, however, the transition policy has a more 
profound effect on subjective economic values. 
Suppose a taxpayer is risk neutral and discounts future cash flows 
at 5o/o. Suppose further that the taxpayer buys some tax-preferred 
investment that would produce a $100 annual tax benefit36 for ten 
years under current law. The present value of these tax benefits is 
$77237 if the expected probability of repeal is 0% or if the expected 
probability of grandfathering is 100%. Suppose that the annual risk of 
repeal is 10%, and taxpayers expect with certainty that any such 
repeal would be prospective (i.e., no grandfathering). Here, the value 
is only $472.38 The importance is that the tax benefit still has value 
even though the taxpayer has no "reliance interest" in receiving 
benefits after repeal. The value, of course, is lower under no-
grandfathering. 
The method for discounting cash flows to present value is 
uncontroversial. But where do expectations of future political change 
come from? This article generally assumes that taxpayers operate 
under "rational expectations," which is an economic term of art 
implying that forecasts are not systematically biased in an observable 
way.39 This is not to say that forecasts are always correct or unbiased. 
Rather, the assumption means that there is no bias that a government 
or other observer could detect. The justifications for this theory are 
(1) an individual's economic interest depends on making the most 
accurate forecasts possible, (2) information available to governments 
and observers is widely available, and (3) individuals will use such 
information to shape their forecasts. Legislation is, after all, enacted 
according to the public deliberations of Congress. For purposes of 
this article, I will interpret the rational expectations assumption to 
36 For present purposes, I assume that the only change that could affect this 
benefit is repeal. Other changes (e.g., a change in general tax rates or an expansion of 
the tax preference) could do so as well. 
37 That is, $100 x [1/(1.05)1 + 11(1.05)2 + ... + 11(1.05)9 + 11(1.05)1~. 
38 That is, $100 x [(0.9/1.05)1 + (0.9/1.05)2 + ... + (0.9/1.05)9 + (0.9/l.OSY~. 
39 For a more complete introduction, see generally SHA VIRO, supra note 10, at 
19-25 and discussion infra Part III.B. 
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mean that (1) future political actions are probabilistic and (2) the 
probability of each possible action is known ex ante. This assumption 
will be relaxed where useful. 
D. Testing Efficiency Ex Ante 
This article tries to answer the following question: Can Congress 
use tax transition rules to achieve revenue or efficiency gains while 
leaving the substantive policy intact? This article further assumes that 
the inquiry should be made from an ex ante perspective. While this is 
an uncontroversial assumption in many respects,40 it is nonetheless 
important in the tax transition context. The appropriate time to 
explore this question is the present, rather than at some presupposed 
time in the future when a political change is assumed to have 
occurred. 
Since transition policies dictate what to do upon the repeal of a 
tax preference, it might be tempting to presuppose repeal (i.e., 
examine transition policies from an ex post perspective). 41 In the 
intermediate future,42 however, repeal may not occur. So, there are 
two possible scenarios: repeal and no-repeal. Complete analysis 
requires an examination of both scenarios. 
For the most part, I will assume that the government is trying to 
achieve a certain substantive policy (e.g., subsidized cost of municipal 
borrowing) in the cheapest possible fashion. Lower governmental 
costs also should also result in increased efficiency for two reasons. 
First, higher spending may result in higher taxes of general 
applicability or greater governmental borrowing, both of which create 
undisputed distortions.43 Second, greater governmental spending will 
make the subsidized assets more attractive, leading taxpayers to invest 
more money in them. As a result, other, unsubsidized projects will (at 
the margin) not be undertaken, because the subsidy "crowds out" 
4
° Cf POSNER, supra note 31, at 8 (explaining emphasis on ex ante perspective 
among economists). The "veil of ignorance" methodology employed by John Rawls 
in constructing his theory of justice could be interpreted as the ultimate ex ante 
analysis. Cf JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
41 I would critique Graetz and Kaplow's articles as having something of an ex 
post perspective. Cf Graetz, supra note 4; Kaplow, supra note 5. Shaviro's book may 
be subject to the same criticism, especially as he has such a clear vision of what the ex 
post perspective should be. Cf SHAVIRO, supra note 10, at 93-95 (arguing for a 
comprehensive tax base without subsidies). 
42 For example, in the next few decades. Repeal of tax preferences is inevitable 
at some time in the future, whether by narrow political action, widespread political 
upheaval, or Armageddon (natural or otherwise). 
43 See Levmore, supra note 9, at 274-75. A contrary explanation is possible 
where the government foregoes wasteful spending in order to transfer funds to 
taxpayers. In this case, an expensive tax preference is more efficient. 
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private investment.44 In other words, taxpayers will invest in less 
efficient subsidized activities over . relatively more efficient 
unsubsidized activities. Thus, showing that one transition rule is 
cheaper than another is tantamount to showing that it is more efficient 
as well. 
Ill. REVENUE AND EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF GRANDFATHERING 
A. Simple Example 
A simple example will be the starting point for analysis in this 
part. Suppose that municipalities can issue bonds with a tax 
preference for interest payments. Assume that today a municipality 
issues a series of bonds with a one-year maturity. Immediately prior to 
the payment of interest one year hence, Congress will vote on whether 
to retain the tax preference. While the outcome of the meeting is 
uncertain, it is nonetheless amendable to probabilistic forecasting. 
This will be the only such meeting that could affect the taxation of the 
bonds. Investors know this. Investors also know the probability of 
repeal and the transition policy that will be used in the event of 
repeal. Assume the following particulars: 
Prevailing taxable interest rate: 
Face value of bond: 
Probability of repeal: 
Tax rate: 
Substantive policy: 
Nominal tax preference: 
Transition policy: 
10% 
$1000 
50% 
40% 
6% municipal borrowing rate 
Exclude interest from 
recipient's income 
Grandfathering 
Under these assumptions, tax-exempt bonds will in fact bear 
interest of 6°/o, thereby achieving the substantive policy goal. The 
prevailing taxable interest rate of 10% reduced by taxes of 40% 
produces an after-tax return of 6%. Investors in the bonds are 
indifferent to repeal because the transition policy is grandfathering. 
The expected cash flow to the government is $0 with respect to the 
bonds.45 
44 Cf HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES, supra note 2, at 1310 (noting 
that higher Treasury borrowing increases interest rates and crowds out private 
investment and consumption at the margin). 
45 The opportunity cost is the lost revenue that the government could have 
gained from these bonds. 
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Suppose the same facts, except that we know the transition policy 
is no-grandfathering. · In order to keep the substantive policy constant 
(i.e., 6% interest on municipal bonds), there would need to be an 
adjustment to the nominal tax preference. If investors are risk 
neutral, they would require an additional 40% credit on interest 
received before they would accept a municipal bond bearing interest 
of 6%. They would require this additional credit to offset the 50% 
chance they will have to pay tax of 40% on interest received in the 
event of repeal. The particulars would change as follows: 
Nominal Tax Preference: 
Transition policy: 
Exclude interest from recipient's 
income plus 40% additional credit 
N o-grandfathering 
In the event of repeal, interest will be subject to tax and no credit 
will be paid. Investors will receive $1000 (face value) plus $60 (pre-
tax interest) minus $24 (40% tax) in one year. This payment of $1,036 
in one year has a present value of $977.36.46 If there is no repeal, 
investors will receive $1000 (face value) plus $60 (tax-exempt interest) 
plus $24 ( 40o/o credit). This payment of $1084 in one year has a 
present value of $1022.64.47 Obviously, the expected value of the bond 
is still $1000. As for cash flows to the government (revenue effects), it 
will receive $24 in the event of repeal and will pay $24 in the event of 
no repeal (i.e., $60 times 40% in both cases). Expected cash flows to 
the government remain zero under a transition policy of no-
grandfathering. · 
The choice of transition policy does not matter in this simple 
example. The government cannot bring the cost of municipal 
borrowing to 6% more cheaply or efficiently with either 
grandfathering or no-grandfathering. Before taxpayers will accept 6% 
interest on municipal bonds, they will need to have an expected tax 
bill of $0. This can be a guarantee of a $0 tax bill (grandfathering) or 
a riskier gamble on a higher credit (no-grandfathering).48 
This simple example is amenable to greater mathematical 
sophistication. One could examine the choice of transition policies 
themselves as probabilistic. Or, the prospect of reform could be small 
but ever present. Surely a more comprehensive model could be 
developed, but the results should be the same. Tax preferences are 
simply subsidies, and taxpayers operating under rational expectations 
know how to value them. Congress cannot achieve a set policy goal 
more cheaply or more efficiently by tampering with the method of 
payment in the event of future repeal. More to the point, we should 
46 $1036 discounted to present value is $1036/(1.06) = $977.36. 
47 $1084 discounted to present value is $1084/(1.06) = $1022.64. 
48 See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 11, at 1167. 
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seriously question the accepted thinking that a transition policy of 
grandfathering is inherently expensive and inefficient. 
B. Questioning the Rational Expectations Assumption 
Changing the simple example from above will illustrate the cost 
and efficiency gains that the government can achieve if taxpayers do 
not operate under rational expectations. To simplify matters, assume 
that taxpayers overestimate or underestimate the prospects for repeal. 
If the government knows their estimates and the true likelihood of 
repeal, then it is able to exploit taxpayers' biases as discussed below. 
1. Overestimating the Likelihood for Repeal 
Returning to our example from above, suppose that taxpayers 
estimate the likelihood of repeal to be 90%. The government knows 
this, but also knows the true likelihood to be 50%. As before, the 
government can achieve its substantive policy of 6% municipal 
borrowing by implementing a nominal preference of tax exclusion and 
a transition policy of grandfathering.49 The cash flow to the 
government is again zero. 
Achieving this substantive policy is more expensive under a 
transition policy of no-grandfathering. In Section A, taxpayers 
operating under rational expectations and no-grandfathering 
demanded an additional credit of 40% in order to offset the 50o/o 
chance that they would be taxed (at 40%) on interest in the event of 
repeal. Under the new assumptions, however, taxpayers would 
demand a credit of 360% in order to offset what they perceive to be a 
90°/o risk of repeal. 50 
The taxpayer mistakenly predicts this to produce an expected 
payoff of $1060 in one year (which is worth $1000 today). In reality, 
the expected payoff is $1156.51 From the government's perspective, 
the expected cost of no-grandfathering is $96,52 unlike grandfathering 
which has no actual cash flows. In general terms, grandfathering is 
49 For simplicity's sake, I have assumed that bias does not extend to taxpayers' 
expectations about the transition policy. 
50 As before, the taxpayer must expect a final payment of $1060. In the event of 
repeal, the taxpayer would receive $1036 after tax (i.e., $1,000 principal plus $60 
interest minus $24 tax). Without repeal, the taxpayer would receive $1276 (i.e., $1000 
principal plus $60 interest plus the 360% credit of $216). This final payout meets 
taxpayers flawed expectations, as (10% x $1036) + (90% x $1276) = $1060. 
51 That is, (50% x $1036) +(50% x $1276) = $1156. 
52 The,expected tax in the event of repeal minus the expected credit in the event 
of no repeal. That is, (50% x $24)- (50% x $216) = -$96. 
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inherently cheaper and more efficient53 when taxpayers overestimate 
the possibility of repeal. In demanding an excessive premium to 
protect themselves, taxpayers are overcompensated for the risk of 
repeal. 54 
2. Underestimating the Likelihood for Repeal 
Returning to our example, suppose this time that taxpayers 
underestimate the likelihood for repeal. Again, assume that the real 
likelihood of repeal is 50%, but that taxpayers believe it to be 10%. 
As before, the substantive policy is 6% municipal borrowing, while 
the tax rate is 40% and taxable interest rate is 10o/o. And, as before, a 
nominal preference of interest exclusion with a transition policy of 
grandfathering achieves this goal. 
Of course, no-grandfathering is now cheaper and more efficient. 
In Section A, taxpayers operating under rational expectations and no-
grandfathering demanded an additional credit of 40% in order to 
offset the 50% chance that they would be taxed (at 40%) on interest 
in the event of repeal. Under the new assumptions, taxpayers would 
demand an additional credit of 5% in order to offset what they 
perceive to be a 10% risk of repeal. 55 
The taxpayer mistakenly predicts this to produce an expected 
payoff of $1060 in one year (which is worth $1000 today). In reality, 
the expected payoff is $1049.50.56 From the government's perspective, 
the expected return of no-grandfathering is $10.50,57 unlike 
grandfathering which has no actual cash flows. In general terms, no-
grandfathering is inherently cheaper and more efficiene8 when 
53 The excessive premium would result in redistribution of wealth to the 
taxpayers. The social welfare gains from this are doubtful. 
54 This is implicitly the point of Professor Logue. See discussion infra Part 
III.B.3. 
55 As before, the taxpayer must expect a final payment of $1060. In the event of 
repeal with no-grandfathering, the taxpayer would receive $1036 after tax (i.e., $1000 
principal plus $60 interest minus $24 tax). Without repeal, the taxpayer would receive 
roughly $1063 (i.e., $1000 principal plus $60 interest plus the 5% credit of $3). This 
payout satisfies the taxpayer's flawed expectations, as (10% x $1036) + (90% x $1063) 
= $1060. 
56 That is, (50% x $1036) + (50% x $1063) = $1049.50. 
57 The expected tax in the event of repeal minus the expected credit in the event 
of no repeal. That is, (50% x $24) -(50% x $3) = $10.50. 
58 The insufficient premium would result in redistribution of wealth from the 
taxpayers to society at large. A government could think of this as an added benefit of 
the no-grandfathering rule. One question that I will raise (but will not try to answer) 
is whether this strategy is just or fair to the taxpayers. In a sense, the government is 
taking advantage of their mistake. Once the taxpayers wise up and learn of their 
exploitation, they may suffer so-called demoralization costs. See Frank I. Michelrnan, 
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taxpayers underestimate the possibility of repeal. This is because they 
demand an economically insufficient premium to protect themselves, 
which in turn undercompensates for the risk of repeal. 59 
3. Bias and Strategic Behavior 
The effect of taxpayer expectations on the efficiency of transition 
policy has been noted before. The primary works in this vein are 
separate (and very different) articles by Professor Kyle Logue60 and 
Dean Saul Levmore,61 as well as a portion of Professor Daniel 
Shaviro's book, Rational Expectations Subject to the Possibility of 
Systematic Error.62 Although I think Shaviro is ultimately right in his 
defense of the rational expectations assumption, Levmore and Logue 
are more provocative and,. therefore, l discuss them more 
comprehensively. 
Professor Logue and I -both analyze tax preferences as incentive 
subsidies and ask how the' government can make them most effective. 
In Professor Logue's view, taxpayers who rely on tax preferences will 
feel "burned" if the government repeals tax preferences. Moreover, 
because the government controls both repeal and the transition rule, 
taxpayers will be concerned that the government will act 
opportunistically. The government will dangle false promises of tax 
preferences before taxpayers. Taxpayers will, at least initially, do the 
government's bidding. They may, however, become jaded and 
panicked after the government fails to live up to its promises. 
Accordingly, taxpayers will eventually assess the likelihood of repeal 
without grandfathering to be high.63 Logue must mean that this 
assessment is high relative to the true likelihood of repeal, which 
would create an incentive for taxpayers to demand expensive "default 
premiums" (default referring to the government's breach of its 
commitment to pay the tax preference). Presumably, Logue believes 
that his default premiums would be expensive for the reasons stated 
above.64 
The problem with Logue's analysis is that his taxpayer 
expectations are erroneous. At first, they leap at the government's tax 
preferences without thinking they could be repealed. The 
government realizes this . and takes advantage. Once burned, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just 
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-18 (1967). 
59 This is implicitly the point of Dean Levmore. See discussion infra Part III. C. 
60 Logue Article, supra note 13. 
61 9 Levmore, supra note . 
62 SHAVIRO, supra note .10, at 19-25. 
63 Logue Article, supra note 13, at 1138-43. 
64 See supra Part III.B.l. 
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taxpayers avoid tax preferences unless they can get high default 
premiums or grandfathering protection. Essentially, Logue argues 
that taxpayers overreact to new information,65 thereby causing a bias 
for overestimating the likelihood of repeal. 
In contrast to Logue, Levmore believes that the government 
could very well get away with burning taxpayers,66 or in the alternative 
that it should at least give it a try once in a while. Levmore's point is 
broader than tax preferences, as he believes that occasional 
retroactive taxation could be efficient. Prospective taxes distort 
decisions about investment, consumption, work, and leisure because 
taxpayers expect the taxes and can plan around them. If unexpected, 
a retroactive tax would cause fewer such distortions because taxpayers 
would not have planned around it.67 
Levmore infers that the government could surprise taxpayers 
occasionally (or at least once ).68 If this is true, then the government 
could attain some of the efficiency gains described in this section, 
where taxpayers underestimate the likelihood of repeal. Perhaps 
taxpayers are always a step or two behind Congress, lending credence 
to the view that individuals are "anchored" to the present.69 
Professor Logue and Dean Levmore provide fascinating accounts, 
and perhaps there is some truth to either or both of them. It is fair to 
say that both scholars view transition policy as a problem of strategic 
behavior,70 with Levmore pondering exploitation and Logue urging 
restraint. I offer no serious challenge to their works but do believe 
they can be explained in terms of rational expectations. Whereas 
Logue's argument depends upon the overestimation of changes in 
relevant law, Levmore's argument depends upon the underestimation 
of the same. In other words, there may be some cognitive bias on the 
part of taxpayers (although we are not sure in which direction). 
Before we base transition policy on this bias, however, we would have 
to· be confident that Congress could discern and exploit a cognitive 
65 Cf SHAVIRO, supra note 10, at 23 (discussing overreaction to new information 
in the context of rational expectations). 
66 Cf Logue Review, supra note 10, at 1517 n.29 (noting differences between 
Logue and Levmore ). 
67 [T]axing past transactions means that future behavior may be less 
distorted by taxes because the [tax] rates applicable to the future can be 
lower than without the retroactive tax .... The central idea is that allocative 
efficiency is served when taxpayers are unable to shift their activities in the 
face of a tax. 
Levmore, supra note 9, at 273. 
68 See id. at 273-74. 
69 Cf SHA VIRO, supra note 10, at 23 (discussing anchoring). 
70 Cf DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1994) ("Strategic behavior arises when two or more individuals interact 
and individual's decision turns on what that individual expects the others to do."). 
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bias that taxpayers are unable to overcome. This is a large task and 
one that has in no way been accomplished. 
Overcoming the rational expectations assumption is particularly 
difficult in the legislative context. Unlike the Federal Reserve with its 
power over monetary policy, Congress works rather openly and is 
subject to lobbying and reelection. We should be careful, then, when 
our arguments depend upon the assumption that members of 
Congress (or professors for that matter) are smarter about the world 
at large than are taxpayers, who have every reason to make the best 
forecasts possible. This, however, is not to say that taxpayers are 
necessarily right or that they cannot be outsmarted. Rather, we 
should expect some clear proof that this is the case. As this clear 
proof has not been provided, an assumption of rational expectations 
by taxpayers is the most appropriate when devising transition policy.71 
C. Increasing Asset Prices After Repeal 
Professor Graetz suggests the price of tax-preferred investments 
would increase after repeal under grandfathering.72 Presumably, this 
would occur because the supply of the preferred investments 
decreases as the investments reach maturity after repeal. Or perhaps 
demand for bonds in the secondary market increases because new tax-
exempt bonds (a substitute) are no longer issued. Either way, prices 
may increase. As prices of bonds go up, yields go down.73 Of course, 
yields would never go below r x (1 - tH), where r is the rate of return on 
comparable taxable instruments and tHis the highest marginal tax rate. 
This yield acts as a natural floor. Returning to the simple example of 
Section A, r = 10%, and tH = 40%; thus, 6% would be the lowest yield 
at which bonds could trade. 
So, for prices to rise after repeal, yields must be greater than 6% 
(r x (1-tH)) prior to repeal. Otherwise, yields could not go down and 
prices could not go up. However, yields exceeding 6% indicate some 
market failure or some structural inefficiency in the tax preference. 
Surprisingly, these inefficiencies can be reduced under a 
grandfathering rule. 
A yield higher than 6% seems to violate the no-arbitrage 
assumption of financial economics. If arbitrageurs could borrow 
money at an interest rate of 10%, use the proceeds to buy tax-exempt 
bonds, and deduct the interest payments, then arbitrageurs (in the 
40o/o tH bracket) could make risk-free profits because they can borrow 
at a rate lower than what they earn. Risk-free profits tend to attract 
11 This is more or less the conclusion of Professor Shaviro. See SHA VIRO, supra 
note 10, at 19-25. 
72 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 72. 
73 See HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES, supra note 2, at 54. 
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considerable attention, so it follows logically that opportunities to 
exploit them do not last for long. This inability to achieve risk-free 
profits is referred to by many as the no-arbitrage assumption. In the 
abstract, arbitrageurs would buy every available bond with a yield 
higher than 6%. So, there is potentially infinite demand for such 
bonds. Such demand would drive yields back down to 6%. 
A real-world problem is that interest payments are not deductible 
if borrowing is used to buy tax-exempt investments.74 As a result, our 
hypothetical arbitrageurs may not be able to deduct their interest 
payments. Without effective arbitrage, the market for tax-exempt 
bonds may be limited to portfolio investors who, unlike arbitrageurs, 
do not have an infinite appetite for bonds with yields slightly higher 
than r x (1-tH). Accordingly, municipalities wotild have to raise their 
yields (perhaps substantially) to attract the desired level of capital 
funds. Bonds may even have yields high enough to attract investors in 
lower brackets (expressed as r x (1-tJ, where tL is the lower tax rate). 
Building on the simple example of Section A, assume that tL is 30%. 
As a result, municipalities may need to raise their yield to 7°/o in order 
to attract the desired level of capital borrowing. Of course, high-
bracket taxpayers get this yield too, meaning they will invest more in 
municipal bonds than they would at 6% (at which rate high-bracket 
taxpayers are indifferent between taxable and tax-exempt bonds). 
It is a matter of some debate in the world of financial economics 
as to whether tax-exempt bonds actually have yields higher than r x 
(1-tH), because it is hard to define the comparable taxable investment 
that produces r. Assuming that the bonds do have higher yields, there 
appears to be an inefficiency in the structure of the tax preference. 
Yields higher than r x (1-tH) distort the investment decisions of high-
bracket taxpayers and reduce the impact of the subsidy on municipal 
borrowing. Opening tax-exempt bonds to arbitrage, or replacing the 
exemption with a credit, would directly eliminate the inefficiency. 
If these first-order solutions are not taken, then implementing a 
grandfathering transition policy would reduce (but not eliminate) the 
inefficiency. A grandfathering transition policy would reduce the 
inefficiency because high-bracket taxpayers may become the marginal 
investors after repeal. Before repeal, risk-neutral investors will accept 
lower nominal yields in the hopes of achieving post-repeal gains by 
selling to high-bracket investors at higher prices. Grandfathering, and 
only grandfathering, preserves some prospect that the efficient 
marginal investor will become the actual marginal investor. 
To illustrate, suppose that before repeal expected yields on tax-
exempt bonds are r x (1-tJ, where tL is a lower marginal tax rate. In 
other words, the marginal buyer is not in the highest tax bracket 
before repeal. In the event of repeal with grandfathering, investors in 
74 See l.R.C. § 265(a)(2). 
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the highest bracket rush to buy as many tax-exempt bonds as possible, 
bidding up prices until yields fall to r x (1-tH). High-bracket investors 
would then become the marginal buyers. If repeal did not occur, then 
low-bracket investors would remain the marginal buyers. 
Assume that a municipality issues bonds with a one-year maturity. 
It is known that immediately after issuance Congress will decide 
whether to retain the exemption on municipal bonds. Returning to 
the simple example of Section A as modified above, the chance of 
repeal is known to be 50%; r = 10%; tv= 30%; and tH = 40% . Under 
grandfathering, the expected yield must equal 7% (i.e., 10% times 
(100% - 30%) ). This is not, however, the nominal yield. Repeal 
would cause a gain for the low-bracket taxpayers (the marginal 
investors) as they can sell their grandfathered bonds at a higher price. 
In a sense, marginal purchasers look to three sources for their returns 
- the borrowing municipality's payment, the government's tax 
preference, and the high-bracket investor's increased demand. 
Assuming our investors to be risk-neutral, the nominal yield will be 
approximately 6.5%.75 This is also the cost of borrowing for 
municipalities under the exemption. 
In order to keep the substantive policy the same with no-
grandfathering under the same set of assumptions, the cost of 
borrowing for municipalities must remain at 6.5%. Again, the 
government cannot attain this with a simple exemption. Rather, it 
must offer some enhanced tax benefit. The important difference here 
is that low-bracket taxpayers have no expectation of selling their 
bonds to high bracket taxpayers for a gain. An exemption plus an 
additional credit of approximately 45% 76 of interest received would 
bring the cost of borrowing to 6.5%. 
Grandfathering is cheaper. Grandfathering, as always, involves 
no net cash flow to the government. No-grandfathering yields a 45% 
credit without repeal and a 30% or 40% tax with repeal. Recall the 
interest payment is $65. Under no-grandfathering, then, the 
government pays $29 per bond if there is no repeal, and receives $26 
( 40%) or $20 (30%) per bond if there is repeal. As the likelihood for 
75 Suppose the face value is $1000 meaning the coupon is worth $65.00. In other 
words, there will be a payment of $1065.00 in one year. If the exemption is repealed, 
this payment is discounted according to the preferences of the high-bracket investor, 
making the value $1065/(1.06) = $1005. If the exemption is not repealed, this payment 
is discounted according to the preferences of the low-bracket investor, making the 
value $1065.00/(1.07) = $995. Discounting for probability of repeal (50%) yields 
(50% X $1005) + (50% X 995) = $1000. 
76 For a $1000 bond, the expected payoff must be $1070. In the event of repeal, 
the payoff in one year is $1045 (i.e., $1000 plus $65 of interest minus $20 of taxes at 
30% ). If there is no repeal, the payoff is $1094 (i.e., $1000 plus $65 of interest plus 
$29 credit at 45%). Discounting for probability yields 50% x $1045 +50% x $1094 = 
$1070. 
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repeal is 50%, the government has negative expected cash flows under 
no-grandfathering: $1.50 per bond for 40% taxpayers and $4.50 per 
bond for 30% taxpayers. 
Of course, this is because municipalities are selling tax-exempt 
bonds to low-bracket taxpayers. High-bracket taxpayers are infra-
marginal as they would accept a lower exemption and still invest in 
the tax-exempt bonds. In a sense, they are relatively less infra-
marginal under grandfathering because there is a greater likelihood 
that they will become the marginal investors upon repeal. Thus, 
grandfathering is more efficient in this context. Municipalities, 
however, could sell all of their bonds to high-bracket taxpayers if they 
could effectively arbitrage tax-exempt bonds. An even better result 
would be to replace the tax-exemption with an equivalent tax credit, 
which would be equally valuable to all taxpayers. Thus, the results of 
this section may generate more antipathy for tax exemptions and the 
anti-arbitrage rules of the tax code than enthusiasm for 
grand fa the ring. 
D. Changing Expectations 
Under the simple example of Section A, I assume that the 
government's substantive policy is for municipal bonds to bear a 
subsidized interest rate of 6%. This would be achieved by exempting 
the interest from tax and providing grandfathering in the event of 
repeal. Finally, the legislature would decide whether to repeal the 
exemption one year after the bonds were issued. It is expected that 
there is a 50% chance of repeal when the legislature meets. 
There is, of course, a tension in these assumptions. We assume 
that municipal bonds must bear 6% exempt interest today. However, 
we also assume that in one year there is a 50% chance they will bear 
10% taxable interest and a 50% chance they will bear 6% tax-exempt 
interest. Thus, the expected interest rate for bonds issued after the 
decision one year later is about 8%. If we assume that the legislature 
acts efficiently,77 we must assume then that the efficient expected 
interest rate in one year is about 8%. Yet, bonds will bear 6% interest 
under grandfathering even if issued up to the eve of the legislature's 
meeting. Thus, pricing under grandfathering takes no account of the 
government's upcoming meeting.78 
Put another way, suppose that a past legislature agreed that 6% 
should be the cost of municipal borrowing, and it implemented a tax 
77 See Graetz, supra note 12; Kaplow, supra note 5; see also supra text 
accompanying note 12. 
78 Yields might actually fall on the eve of the meeting for the reason set forth in 
Part III.C., because high-bracket taxpayers expect the future supply of bonds to 
decline. 
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exemption and grandfathering to accomplish this. Subsequent 
economic events might suggest that the exemption is no longer 
appropriate. The legislature plans to convene soon to decide the fate 
of the exemption (with a 50% chance for repeal). Should bonds bear 
a subsidized 6o/o rate until the meeting? 
Graetz and Kaplow expect that grandfathering will keep 
municipal borrowings at a subsidized rate of 6%, even though the 
future decision by the legislature casts doubts on the efficiency of this 
subsidy.79 Municipalities will borrow too heavily when the subsidized 
rate of interest is 6°/o but the efficient rate is higher. On the other 
hand, no-grandfathering allows for something of an automatic 
adjustment. Under the simple example from Section A, if the nominal 
preference is income exclusion and the transition policy is no 
grandfathering, then bonds will yield 7.5% interest on the eve of the 
decision by the legislature.80 If the policy is grandfathering, the yield is 
6%. The Graetz-Kaplow view is that grandfathering is inefficient 
because it fails to reflect the uncertain future of the tax exemption.81 
Any upfront lump-sum subsidy, however, will have the same effect as 
an installment subsidy under grandfathering. Both are "guaranteed" 
payments. Accordingly, the Graetz-Kaplow view could be interpreted 
as holding that guaranteed subsidies are inefficient when compared 
with contingent subsidies. 
There is value to this view when economic changes reflect 
something like a "discovery" of efficient policy - hence, Graetz and 
Kaplow's analogy to market and technological change.82 Subsidized 
borrowing by municipalities may have seemed a good idea years ago. 
If times (and economic thinking) change, Congress might change its 
mind as well. Graetz and Kaplow assume these changes in thinking by 
Congress are for the better and should be implemented as soon as 
possible because taxpayers will anticipate these changes under a rule 
of no-grandfathering.83 Perhaps they are right, and the history of the 
tax code really is nothing other than the progress of the consciousness 
of efficiency. Others have questioned whether this is reasonable or 
true.84 
Even if the history of the Code is the progress of the 
consciousness of efficiency, efficient legislation would not necessarily 
require anticipation by taxpayers. It is worth remembering that tax 
preferences are essentially subsidies and tools for government 
79 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 54-63; Kaplow, supra note 5, at 584-87. 
80 As before, investors must expect a payoff of $1060. If the preference is not 
repealed, investors receive $1075. If it is repealed, they receive $1045. 
81 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 60-73; Kaplow, supra note 5, at 551-57, 584-87. 
82 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 65-66; Kaplow, supra note 5, at 533-36. 
83 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 63-73; Kaplow, supra note 5, at 550-60. 
84 See, e.g., Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 11, at 1166. 
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economic control (for better or worse). Perhaps tax-exempt bonds 
are an efficient means for achieving some quantifiable goal (say, 
construction of X number of schools) and we know that this goal will 
be reached in the near future at current levels of borrowing. When 
the goal is reached, the exemption will be repealed. A transition 
policy of no-grandfathering would actually thwart this goal by 
decreasing the number of bonds issued as the goal becomes imminent 
(the last bond sold under the tax preference would not be subsidized 
at all). Or, perhaps the exemption is being repealed and replaced with 
a direct subsidy of municipalities in the near future. Is it at all clear 
that we would want a drop in the subsidy of municipalities between 
the date we learn of the change and the date it is implemented? 
All that changed expectations tell us is that subsidy will be 
inefficient in the future. It may or may not remain efficient today. 
Perhaps it was inefficient all along, but there are other explanations as 
well. Final achievement of policy goals may be imminent, or the tax 
preference may be replaced but not repealed. In short, expectations 
about future repeal are inherently ambiguous. 
IV. RISKFACfORS 
A. Financial Risk Premiums 
Risk-averse taxpayers may require an additional premium based 
on the financial risk of no-grandfathering. In financial analysis, an 
investment has an expected return (i.e., the mean of all possible 
returns) and an associated risk (i.e., the statistical variance of all 
possible returns). Risk-averse taxpayers do not, however, demand a 
premium for all types of risk. Risks that can be diversified away in a 
portfolio of investments ("unsystematic" or "asset-specific" risk) carry 
no premium. Risks that cannot be diversified away ("systematic" or 
"market" risk) do carry a premium.85 
Conceptually, systematic risk is related to economy-wide factors 
(e.g., GDP, interest rates, and inflation) whereas unsystematic risk is 
related to asset-specific factors (e.g., the creditworthiness of a 
municipal debtor).86 Whether the risk of repeal is systematic is 
unclear. A tax preference might be repealed simply to pay for 
spending on other projects, signifying unsystematic risk that may not 
carry a risk premium. Major economic upheavals might cause 
fundamental tax reform, signifying systematic risk that does carry a 
risk premium. It is likely there is always an element of both types of 
risk, meaning there is always a financial risk premium under no-
85 See STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE fiNANCE 293-94 (4th ed. 1996). 
86 See id. at 270, 293-94. 
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grandfathering. If this is the case, the least risky choice of transition 
rules would have the lowest revenue costs.87 
Risk does not refer simply to the possibility that an investment 
will fall in value, but also to its volatility of return. Grandfathering 
may not eliminate volatility if grandfathered investments increase in 
value upon repeal.88 Low-bracket taxpayers may accept lower 
nominal yields in exchange for the opportunity to sell at a gain in the 
event of repeal with grandfathering.89 This opportunity is risky. 
Accordingly, low-bracket taxpayers may require a risk premium 
before accepting this lower yield. However, the price fluctuations 
caused by repeal with grandfathering should be less volatile than the 
price fluctuations caused by repeal without grandfathering.ro Thus, 
grandfathering should have less financial risk and be cheaper. 
B. Efficient Risk Allocation 
The crux of Professors Graetz and Kaplow's argument is that it is 
efficient for taxpayers to forecast future law changes so they can 
anticipate and respond to the changing likelihood that a tax 
preference will be repealed.91 It is certainly true that the ability to 
seek a tax preference (such as the municipal bond exemption) is 
within the taxpayer's control. Taxpayers can exercise this control to 
avoid the possibility of financial loss, which may be greater under a 
rule of no-grandfathering. Thus, the incentive to avoid loss is greater 
under no-grandfathering. 
It is also true, however, that the ability to grant and repeal tax 
preferences is within the control of Congress. Congress can exercise 
this control to avoid financial loss. These losses are greater under a 
87 Of course, the least risky method of all is a one-time lump sum, versus an 
installment subsidy. Rather than exempting municipal bond interest from tax, the 
government could alternatively subsidize the initial purchase. This would also obviate 
the need for a transition policy. For an argument in favor of this approach, see 
Goldberg, supra note 28, passim. 
88 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
s9 Id. 
90 Suppose that low-bracket (30%) taxpayers are the marginal investors, 
meaning that expected yields are 7% before the decision on repeal is reached. As 
before, the taxable interest rate is 10%. If prices rise after repeal with grandfathering, 
it is because high-bracket ( 40%) taxpayers have become the marginal purchasers. In 
the examples above, the yield fell from 7% to 6%, a 14% decline. If the exemption is 
repealed without grandfathering, bond prices fall and yields will rise from 7% to 10%, 
a 43% increase. A 43% rise in yield will produce a larger absolute impact on bond 
price than a 14% decline. See HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES, supra note 
2, at 93. 
91 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 65-71; Kaplow, supra note 5, at 522-36. 
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rule of grandfathering. Thus, the incentive of Congress to repeal tax 
preferences may be greater under grandfathering. 
In short, both taxpayers and Congress are in a position to avoid 
losses by anticipating future change. The question then is who should 
lead in the fandango of tax preferences. We need to answer two 
preliminary questions to come to a conclusion. First, who is the so-
called least-cost avoider with respect to these losses: the taxpayer or 
Congress? Second, even if Congress is the least-cost avoider, will it 
respond appropriately to risk allocation? 
However, just because one is in a position to avoid loss does not 
mean that one should bear the risk of it. The law consistently places 
the risk on one party even if both parties could have avoided the risk. 
The economic rationale is that the law should place the risk of loss on 
the "least-cost avoider," absent a contractual allocation to the 
contrary. The least-cost avoider is the entity that can most cheaply 
avoid losses.92 I can reduce the risk of loss from the tort of battery by 
wearing a helmet. That does not, however, mean that I should forego 
compensation if clubbed while not wearing a helmet. Similarly, I can 
reduce the risk of loss from a contract breach by demanding that 
funds be placed in an escrow account until performance is complete. 
That does not, however, mean I should forego compensation if the 
other party breaches. The legal risk of these losses does not fall upon 
me even though I could have taken steps to avoid them. The 
economic story is that the tortfeasor and the contract breacher are 
better situated to avoid causing these losses ex ante. Therefore, it 
follows logically that they should bear the risk of loss. 
Suppose, as Graetz and Kaplow do, that the reasons for repealing 
a tax preference are either the discovery that it is not efficient, or the 
occurrence of some economic event that renders it inefficient. An 
efficiency-minded government93 will try to make the discovery or 
detect the occurrence of the economic event. This must, at some 
poirit, be the case or else the law would never change. These efforts 
further social welfare if we believe the reason for repealing tax 
preferences is efficiency. Under a rule of no-grandfathering, 
taxpayers will have the incentive to pursue these efforts as well in 
order to anticipate future legislative changes. Under a rule of 
grandfathering, the incentive is nonexistent or much weaker. 
There are two severe problems with allocating the burden of 
these efforts to taxpayers with a rule of no-grandfathering. First, 
taxpayers face an obvious collective action problem. The taxpayer 
92 See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); POSNER, 
supra note 31, at 105-06, 179-83. 
93 See Graetz, supra note 12; Kaplow, supra note 5; see also supra text 
accompanying note 12. 
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will invest in determining whether a tax preference is efficient only to 
the extent that she benefits from such an investment. Second, the 
government probably cannot free~ride on whatever efforts taxpayers 
muster, because taxpayers under no-grandfathering will have an 
incentive to make self-serving reports that are not public-spirited (e.g., 
they will say the tax preference is always efficient). Accordingly, 
government will have to duplicate any efforts that taxpayers make. 
This is a prima facie case that the government is the least-cost avoider 
with respect to responding to changing expectations about tax 
preferences. Thus, since the government is better situated to respond 
to economic changes relative to the average taxpayer, the government 
should bear the burden of responding to such changes - assuming, of 
course, that the government will respond to this burden in an 
economically rational manner. 
This analysis raises the final question of this section. Would the 
government actually respond to the imposition of grandfathering costs 
like an ordinary economic actor would? In other words, will the 
government internalize and try to avoid the costs it would bear under 
grandfathering? After all, theory places the risk of loss on the least-
cost avoider so that the loss can actually be avoided. Private firms 
that fail to respond face the risk of reduced profitability or insolvency. 
The federal government does not seek pecuniary profit, and it faces 
no danger of insolvency. If the least-cost avoider is institutionally 
incapable of avoiding the loss, but remains obliged to compensate for 
it, then it becomes a mere insurer. 
Nothing about the structure of government gives us any clear 
insight into how it would respond. Under one possible (if 
implausible) story, the government is so efficiency-minded that it will 
take the optimal level of steps to repeal expired tax preferences 
regardless of the transition rule.94 This would argue for a rule of 
grandfathering in order to prevent taxpayers from overinvesting in 
precautions against repeal. Under the converse story, the government 
is so pathological that it will have the same delay in repealing expired 
tax preferences regardless of the transition rule. This may argue for a 
rule of no-grandfathering. Under a middle story, the government 
response varies depending on the context in which it arises. It may 
seek efficient legislation in general (e.g., repeal of an expired tax 
preference) but fail to account for certain social costs in the timing of 
its action (e.g., unnecessary forecasting costs incurred privately 
because the government fails to act expediently). The fundamental 
question is, how does the government respond to the imposition of 
costs? 
94 This is a stronger version of Graetz and Kaplow's assumption that tax 
legislation is efficient. 
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This is an interesting question, one that has just begun to be 
addressed.95 It may be naive to conclude that the government cannot 
internalize costs at all. One could imagine a simple model of 
government, where legislators have a boundless appetite for political 
spending that is checked only by the political costs of increasing taxes 
and public debt. This is a corollary model to the economic actor. For 
example, a wage earner has a boundless appetite for more wages, but 
this is checked by lost leisure time and fatigue associated with 
increased wo:r;k. Our wage earner can be expected to balance these 
competing concerns in a manner so that the marginal economic 
benefit and marginal economic costs of additional work are equal. 
Our political actor can be expected to balance its competing concerns 
so that the marginal political benefits and marginal political costs of 
increased spending are offset. 
Under this simple model, the government faces real political 
consequences by incurring avoidable costs that produce no political 
benefit. The case of constitutional torts comes to mind. 96 The 
government presumably achieves no political benefit by compensating 
the tort victim (contrast this with transfers to special interest groups). 
In fact, the government incurs political harm by making these 
payments, because the funds used will no longer be available for 
projects that would produce political gains (e.g., defense spending, 
school construction), or the government will need to undertake the 
politically unpopular acts of raising taxes or public borrowing to 
replace the funds. 
Returning to the issue of tax transitions, we can assume that the 
calculus for tax preferences has changed when tax preferences are 
repealed. The government has chosen to deploy the related 
expenditures elsewhere. Grandfathering would give the government 
an incentive to act quickly to repeal the tax preference so as to 
minimize the cost imposed on the government by new tax-motivated 
investments.97 If we think government will respond to this incentive, 
then the government should bear the cost. 
Thus, the transition rule is essentially a contractual term 
specifying who should bear the cost if the contract comes to an end. 
Perhaps this should be the government, particularly since it controls 
the duration of the contract. Moreover, a self-interested government 
95 For pioneering work, see Daryl J . Levinson, Making Government Pay: 
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 
(2000). 
96 The theory of making government pay for constitutional torts is discussed at 
length by Professor Levinson. See id. 
97 This assumes that taxpayers who rely on tax preferences are agents of the 
government doing its bidding. The taxpayers, however, may simply be clients 
receiving transfer payments from the government. 
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may even submit to grandfathering voluntarily. Under a theory of 
rational expectations discussed above, taxpayers will forecast which 
transition rule will apply without bias. Under a rule of no-
grandfathering, taxpayers will need to incur more costs to forecast the 
future actions of the government. Taxpayers will know this and 
accordingly will require a premium in the subsidy to avoid these costs. 
The government can avoid paying this premium by following a rule of 
grandfathering. 
C. Risk as an Obstacle to Political Reform 
In 1989, Professors Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato 
questioned the underlying assumptions of the Graetz-Kaplow view 
and raised concerns about how transition rules would affect the tax 
legislative process.98 In seeking grandfathering, of benefits or fighting 
tax reform altogether, taxpayers will (1) incur real social costs and (2) 
make direct transfers to legislators. Guaranteeing tax benefits would 
eliminate both of these activities. Self-interested legislators, however, 
would not guarantee tax benefits because they would lose the ability 
to receive the direct transfers.99 Leaving the transition issue open 
unshackles even more sinister impulses of legislators. "Legislators do 
have tremendous incentives to promote [transfer of wealth to 
legislators], and tax reform gives them an ideal chance to do just that. 
In exchange for not engaging in tax reform, legislators can demand 
campaign contributions, honoraria, and bribes. "100 Thus, Congress can 
use the tax code to shake down or pay off its constituents.101 
98 See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 11. 
99 See id. at 1171-75. 
100 ( See id. at 1172 (emphasis added) citing Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction 
and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 
(1987)). 
101 Consider the repeated "expiration" and "reenactment" of the research tax 
credit over the past 21 years. See generally BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS S27-10 to S27-11, 'II 27.4.1 (Warren 
Gorham & Lamont, Supp. No.3, 2002). Under section 41 of the Code, taxpayers can 
receive a credit for engaging in certain research activities. Over the history of this 
section, the credit has always been nominally temporary (e.g., applicable only to 
research expenditures made before some sunset date in the near future). Congress 
has extended the provision more than ten times in an annual ritual of corporate 
lobbying. See Greg Hitt, What Has 9 Deaths And Always, to Date, A New Lease on 
Life?- The Answer Has Provided a Very Nice Livelihood for Lobbyist Weinberger, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1998, at Al. Lobbyists like work and Congress likes lobbyists, so 
why not plan a get-together at least once a year? In the end, only expenditures made 
between June 30, 1995 and July 1, 1996 remained ineligible for the credit. The credit 
is currently set to expire on June 30, 2004. See I.R.C. § 41(h). 
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In more general terms, financial risk and political costs102 are 
positively correlated. Taxpayers who face risk can gain or lose from 
legislation, and as such will seek to influence it. As noted above, a 
transition rule of no-grandfathering creates more risk. By creating 
more risk, it creates more political costs. We should expect these 
political costs to deliver some type of result. If recipients of tax 
preferences are mainly interested in maintaining the status quo, then a 
rule of no-grandfathering would tend to stymie political reform. 
Assume a reform-minded faction of Congress wanted to do away with 
the tax exemption for municipal bonds. Grandfathering old bonds 
would effectively negate opposition from current bondholders.103 
Future bondholders are unlikely to be organized. Even if they were 
organized, they are unlikely to be interested because they face far less 
risk from repeal having not yet purchased a bond. Of course, 
municipalities are keenly interested in issuing new bonds, and would 
remain an obstacle to reform. Still, reformers would rather contend 
with one interest group than two. 
The goal of Part III was to demonstrate that grandfathering does 
not generate any systematic costs or inefficiencies from an ex ante 
perspective. So, removing current bondholders from the cadre of 
interest groups may be economically cost free. 104 Doing so, however, 
would involve something of a political commitment by Congress to 
grandfather tax preferences upon repeal - whether or not anyone 
lobbies them to do so. Professors Ramseyer and Nakazato believe 
there is little reason that Congress would abandon this valuable power 
to grant or withhold grandfathering protection. Moreover, Congress 
may well be hostile to pro-grandfathering theories based on the 
suspected greed of its members.105 
A final point is on the relationship between financial risk and 
insurance. Professor Kaplow (wrongly, I believe) compares 
grandfathering rules to mandatory, subsidized insurance. Under his 
theory, grandfathering should be eliminated and the private market 
should provide insurance only to those taxpayers who want it. 1~ For 
example, taxpayers who invest in municipal bonds could buy 
insurance to protect themselves in the event of repeal of the tax 
exemption. Assuming that a market would arise for such insurance, 
102 By political cost, I mean resources used to influence legislation. 
103 Current bondholders may even gain from repeal, turning them into advocates 
for reform. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
104 This may be economically cost free because, as I have argued throughout, 
grandfathering rules do not result in any greater efficiency or fiscal losses than do 
other transition rules. 
105 Professor Shaviro has a similar problem in his book. See SHA VIRO, supra note 
10, at 101; Logue Review, supra note 10, at 1529-30. 
106 See Kaplow, supra note 5, at 536-40. 
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risk of repeal would be shifted from dispersed investors to organized 
insurance companies. Insurance companies are themselves no 
strangers to lobbying, and it seems likely that they would attempt to 
stymie tax reform when their interests are at stake. In short, 
insurance companies would themselves become a nexus for political 
organization. Conceivably, they could even deliver grandfathering 
protection only to their insureds, taking Ramseyer and Nakazato's 
protection racket to a new level. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this article is not to praise grandfathering as a 
respected policy, but to exhume it. Transition policy itself is simply a 
way of specifying cash flows after political change. Cash flows are 
guaranteed under grandfathering and contingent under no-
grandfathering. Our initial reaction to this is that neither policy 
should be more expensive to the government than the other. In order 
to achieve a set goal, the government will need to pay a set price. The 
price might be a lump sum, a guaranteed installment, or a contingent 
installment. The method of financing the goal should not affect the 
cost. 
The one area where no-grandfathering shines as a policy is its 
ability to adjust taxpayer incentives automatically without immediate 
Congressional action when change occurs. It is not altogether clear, 
however, that automatic adjustments are always (or even usually) 
needed. Moreover, perhaps Congress, rather than taxpayers, should 
have the incentive to act immediately. A rule of grandfathering would 
give Congress this incentive so long as it behaves like an ordinary 
economic actor. Moreover, grandfathering should lower lobbying and 
opposition to political reform. It is unclear, however, whether 
Congress would be inclined to forego using transition policy for 
political gain. 
In essence, transition policy simply describes how government 
chooses to finance its projects, and this choice is usually ambiguous if 
not irrelevant. Economists have long since abandoned the notion that 
the method of financing business activities has an inherent effect on 
the value of the enterprise. 107 Perhaps tax scholars should do the 
same. 
107 See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958); Ross ET AL., 
supra note 80, at 472-99 (discussing the Modigliani-Miller theory of corporate 
finance). 
